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Abstract 
In this paper we determine the noise properties needed for unconditional security for the ideal 
Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system using simple statistical analysis. It 
has already been shown using physical laws that resistors and Johnson-like noise sources provide 
unconditional security. However real implementations use artificial noise generators, therefore it is a 
question if other kind of noise sources and resistor values could be used as well. We answer this 
question and in the same time we provide a theoretical basis to analyze real systems as well. 
Introduction 
Communication security is getting more and more important in many different applications 
including electronic banking, protecting personal data, securing intellectual property of companies, 
transmission of medical data and many more. The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) protocol was 
introduced as a low cost unconditionally secure key exchange protocol using only passive 
components: four resistors, two switches and interconnecting wires [1]. The protocol is based only 
on the laws of classical physics and has been introduced as an inexpensive alternative to quantum 
communicators. The first real implementation has been shown a few years after its discovery [2, 3] 
and it has inspired the development of another secret key exchanged method [4]. There are many 
potential applications including securing computers, algorithms and hardware (memories, 
processors, keyboards, mass storage media) [5], key distribution over the Smart Grid [6], ethernet 
cables [7], uncloneable hardware keys [8]. Several attack methods has been discussed [9-14], 
however the ideal KLJN system is found to be secure. Debates are still going on [15,16] and recent 
papers discuss practical considerations for the applications [17,18]. 
The KLJN key exchange protocol is rather simple. During the communication a secret key is 
generated and shared between the two communicating parties, Alice and Bob. The system consists 
of two communicators and a transmission wire, see Fig. 1. 
 
Figure 1. The KLJN secure communication system. 
Each communicator includes two resistors RL and RH and two series voltage noise sources VLA(t), 
VHA(t) and VLB(t), VHB(t) representing the thermal noise of the resistors at Alice and Bob, respectively: 
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where SL(f) is the power spectral density of the voltage noise sources VLA(t), VLB(t) and SH(f) is the 
power spectral density of the voltage noise sources VHA(t), VHB(t); k is the Boltzmann constant and T is 
the temperature. 
A switch is used to select one of the resistors to be connected to the wire connecting the two 
communicators, see Fig. 1. At the beginning of each bit exchange, both Alice and Bob connect a 
resistor (RH or RL) to the wire. If both, Alice and Bob connect the higher value resistor, the voltage 
noise level will be high in the wire. If they both connect the low value resistor, the voltage noise will 
be low. If they connect different value resistors, the noise level will be intermediate and this is 
invariant if the resistors are swapped. [1,13]. This level can also be identified by the eavesdropper, 
Eve, however she cannot determine who has chosen the low value resistor. For this reason, this is 
the secure state that can be used for key exchange. 
Note that in real applications the noise would be too small, therefore artificial noise generators 
are used to provide large enough signals in a given frequency band. In this case, the noise equivalent 
temperature is above 109 K [1]. On the other hand generators can enhance the security and offer 
new schemes with higher practical security in the non-ideal situations [17]. 
Results 
According to the papers about the KLJN communication method the artificial noise generators 
are only used to emulate high temperatures, so they must generate Johnson-like noise. Therefore 
the security proof based on physical laws remains valid [1]. Our approach is in some sense opposite 
to the previous ones, when security has been proven for the given noise properties. Here we 
determine what the requirements of noise properties for unconditional security are. On the other 
hand, our analysis is based on statistical methods instead of physical laws of thermodynamics, 
therefore it can be more easily understandable for computer engineers and software engineers. 
Let us assume that the system is operated in the LH situation, when Alice has switched on the 
lower value resistor and noise, while Bob uses the higher value resistor and noise as shown in Fig. 1. 
In this case Eve measures the following voltage VE(t) and current IE(t) (flowing from Bob’s side 
towards Alice) in the wire: 
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where VLA(t) and VHB(t) are the voltage noise signals at Alice and Bob, respectively. She can have 
two hypotheses: the correct one and the opposite. She can calculate the statistics of Alice’s voltage 
noise for both cases. Since she knows the resistor values and the used voltage noise statistics, it is 
clear, that she will know that her assumption is wrong, if she gets invalid values during her 
calculations. For the correct assumption she must get correct results of course. Let us see what 
happens in the case of the wrong hypothesis. In this case Eve assumes that the high value resistor 
has been chosen by Alice. Therefore she calculates Alice’s noise voltage VA(t) as: 
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The variance is given by the sum of variances: 
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where A
2 is the variance of VA(t) and L
2 and H
2 are the variances of the voltage noise VLA(t) and 
VHB(t), respectively. 
The communication can only be secure if A=H, otherwise Eve will know that Alice connected 
the low value resistor and voltage generator to the wire. Substituting this into Eq. (8) yields: 
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or in other form 
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Therefore the noise amplitude must depend on the resistance as in the case of thermal noise; it 
must be proportional to the square root of the resistance. Otherwise the communication is certainly 
unsecure. 
In the following we check how the security depends on the probability distribution of the noise. 
When the eavesdropper makes the correct assumption, she can calculate the noise signal that Alice is 
using exactly; therefore she gets the correct probability distribution of course. When she makes the 
wrong assumption then she obtains: 
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The probability density pA(x) of VA(t) is given by the convolution of the probability densities of the 
two independent terms in Eq. (13). If p(x) is the probability density function with unity variance, 
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where A
2 is the variance of VA(t), and 
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If Eq. (12) is satisfied, then A=H, that is needed for secure communication. Furthermore pA(x) 
measured by Eve must also be identical to the probability density function pH(x) of the noise voltages 
VHA(t) and VHB(t), otherwise Eve can detect that her assumption is wrong. Therefore using Eqs. (16) 
and (17) pA(x) can be expressed as 
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and finally we get 
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Discussion 
Eq. (19) is valid for normal distribution only [19], therefore we can conclude that the noise 
sources VLA(t), VLB(t) and VHA(t), VHB(t) must have normal distribution and the ratio of their amplitude 
must be equal to the square root of the ratio of the corresponding resistor values. In other words, 
Johnson-like noise must be used for the secure key exchange in the KLJN system. Note that although 
several other distributions – for example Cauchy-distribution – satisfy the condition that the 
convolution in Eq. (19) does not change the type of distribution, however the finite variance required 
by energetic considerations is only provided by normal distribution. 
It is easy to see that for example random numbers with uniform distribution can’t be used for 
secure communication. In this case Eq. (17) gives a trapezoidal probability density function for pA(x) 
as shown on Fig. 2, therefore its deviation from pH(x) can be very easily detected.  
 
Figure 2. The probability density function pA(x) in the case of uniform distribution (solid line) 
strongly differs from pH(x) (dashed line). 
We have developed a simple software application written in LabVIEW that can be used to 
simulate the KLJN protocol [20]. Normal or uniform distribution can be selected and the values of RL, 
RH, amplitude of VLA(t), VLB(t) and VHA(t), VHB(t) can be arbitrarily chosen. The application performs 
Eve’s calculation of VA(t) for both hypotheses, and plots the corresponding measured amplitudes and 
probability densities. 
Limitations and Open Questions 
We have presented a mathematical statistical approach to determine the noise properties and 
resistor values required for secure communication and the results are in agreement with the original 
physical approach [1]. On the other hand our work does not address the question of complete 
security. 
Considerable additional work could be carried out to investigate several attack types with similar 
approach. For example, in practical applications the effect of resistor inaccuracies, wire resistances 
can also be analyzed using our method; Eq. (8) can be applied to find the difference between the 
observed and expected variances, A
2
 and H
2, respectively. This means that the information leak due 
to these inaccuracies can be estimated. On the other hand, if the desired security level is given, the 
required resistor values and accuracy of the components can be obtained. 
Furthermore one can consider correlation properties, bandwidth of the noise sources that is 
important in practical applications and discussed in several publications. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown a mathematical statistical approach to find out what kind of noise 
sources are required for secure communications in the Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson-Noise unconditionally 
secure key exchange system. In agreement with the results can be found in the literature we found 
that the noise amplitude must scale with the square root of the corresponding resistor value and 
Gaussian noise sources must be used. 
Note that our approach can serve as a starting point to quantitatively analyze several attack 
types in practical applications. 
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